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ONE JURY INDIVISIBLE: A GROUP DYNAMICS APPROACH
TO VOIR DIRE
TRACY L. TREGER*
INTRODUCTION
This Note will explore the group dynamics literature to show how
consideration of the jury as a whole may aid in voir dire and to illustrate
some limitations on jury selection techniques. The American judicial
system guarantees citizens the right to trial by an impartial jury of their
peers. 1 Every year, litigants, taxpayers and the courts invest a substantial
sum on jury selection to ensure that the parties will receive a fair trial. It
is no secret, however, that in our adversarial system, each side will at-
tempt to choose jurors who are likely to favor their case at trial. Simi-
larly, parties attempt to excuse jurors who are biased toward their
opponents. The primary challenge faced by attorneys in jury selection is
trying to predict in advance how each member of the venire will vote. 2
Additionally, it is difficult to tell whether a favorable verdict is the result
of careful jury selection, persuasive arguments and evidence at trial, or
some other factor.3 Hindsight is not always 20 - 20.
Social scientists have attempted to aid frustrated litigators by apply-
ing psychological techniques to the jury selection process. However, the
success of scientific jury selection remains speculative. Part of the diffi-
culty in measuring the effectiveness of psychologically assisted jury selec-
tion is that we are precluded from examining what goes on inside the jury
room. We cannot tell from the final verdict which jurors were the most
instrumental in pushing the decision through the deliberations and which
jurors were the most resistant.4
* B.A. 1989, University of Pennsylvania; M.S. 1990, Psychological Services, University of
Pennsylvania; J.D. Candidate 1993, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of Technology.
Special thanks to Prof. Richard Warner for his thoughts and assistance in preparing this note.
1. U.S. CONST. amend. VI (criminal cases); U.S. CONST. amend. VII (civil cases); see also
MORRIS J. BLOOMSTEIN, VERDICT: THE JURY SYSTEM 139-43 (1972) (listing state constitutions
and statutes guaranteeing the right to trial by an impartial jury).
2. Michael K. Demetrio, Using Market Research Techniques to Select a Jury, Lecture on the
problems and procedures of jury selection at the Chicago Bar Association (Nov. 18, 1991).
3. ROBERT J. MACCOUN, GETTING INSIDE THE BLACK Box: TOWARD A BETTER UNDER-
STANDING OF CIVIL JURY BEHAVIOR 5 (1987).
4. Social scientists have noted this difficulty in distinguishing between the effects of individuals
on group behavior and the effects of the group as a whole on the group behavior. David A. Kenny &
Lawrence La Voie, Separating Individual and Group Effects, 48 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.
339 (1985).
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This uncertainty is the primary focus of the group dynamics model.
The model suggests a number of factors that influence the ways in which
a small group, such as a jury, interacts. These factors include the roles
that each individual juror plays in the jury room, stereotypes held by
each person and the proportion of jurors with given demographic traits.
Every group is unique because of its specific combination of individuals
and their attitudes. The role that one plays in a particular group depends
on who the other group members are. Further, people rely on stereo-
types to differing extent based on the availability of additional informa-
tion about others. These group processes are not readily discovered
during voir dire, yet their effects on the outcome of the trial are
tremendous. 5
The litigants, therefore, would want to learn something about the
group dynamics of the ultimate jury during voir dire. The ability to pre-
dict the roles that each potential juror would play if selected would be an
invaluable guide to this process. Unfortunately, it is not possible to glean
this crucial information. At best, voir dire can provide an incomplete
picture of how the jury will decide the case. It does not make sense,
then, to permit extensive questioning during voir dire since the litigants
will never be able to discover what they really want to know. A prefera-
ble practice would be to curtail the length and scope of voir dire in order
to conserve judicial resources.
Section I of this Note provides background information about voir
dire including a brief history, the rules governing it, and its goals and
scope. Section II describes scientific jury selection, the process by which
social scientists aid lawyers in impaneling jurors. Section III presents a
psychological model of group dynamics. The model suggests that there
is more to predicting how group members will interact than merely de-
termining who will be the group leaders. Section IV posits that in order
for attorneys to select the jurors from the venire who are most likely to
return a favorable verdict, they would need to know something about the
dynamics of the entire jury that is ultimately selected. However, neither
the traditional methods of jury selection nor those guided by social scien-
tists are sufficient to glean this critical information about the jury's dy-
namics. This Note concludes that extensive voir dire is a waste of
resources for both the court and the litigants.
5. Cf Neal Miller, Facts Expert Facts, and Statistics: Descriptive and Experimental Research
Methods in Litigation, 40 RUTGERs L. REv. 467, 489 (1988).
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I. VOIR DIRE
The term "voir dire" literally means "to speak the truth."' 6 The ulti-
mate goal of voir dire is to insure that the jury is composed of individuals
who are competent to weigh the evidence presented at trial, to decide the
facts, and to judge witness credibility without bias, prejudice, or partial-
ity.7 The jury must be able to decide the case on its merits, that is, solely
on the basis of the evidence presented at trial." Ideally, through a series
of questions, the court or counsel seeks the truth about each venireper-
son's views to eliminate jurors who will be unlikely to arrive at a just
verdict because of adverse beliefs about either party. 9 The attorneys may
exercise challenges either for cause1° or peremptorily1' in order to elimi-
nate jurors who they believe to be biased in some way.
In addition to the purpose of impaneling an impartial jury, voir dire
may serve other functions. These include an opportunity for the attor-
neys and jurors to get to know each other, 12 the chance to educate the
venire about the issues and relevant law applicable to the case,13 a way to
minimize damaging facts in advance of the trial, 14 and a testing ground
6. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 195 (1969).
7. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 188 (1981); United
States v. Guy, 924 F.2d 702, 707 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. Schnabel, 939 F.2d 197, 201 (4th
Cir. 1991); Kingston v. Turner, 505 N.E.2d 320, 328 (Ill. 1987); Susan E. Jones, Judge- Versus
Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire: An Empirical Investigation of Juror Candor, 11 L. & HUM. BEHAV.
131, 132 (1987); Nancy L. Alvarez, Comment, Racial Bias and the Right to an Impartial Jury: A
Standard for Allowing Voir Dire Inquiry, 33 HASTINGS L.J. 959, 961 (1982) (criminal cases).
8. Smith v. Phillips, 455 U.S. 209, 217 (1982); Lillian B. Hardwick, Juror Misconduct, 17
LITIG. 35, 37 (1991).
9. 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 195 (1969). Clearly, of course, adversaries conducting voir dire
strive to select jurors who will be partial to their clients' cases. Michael J. Saks, The Limits of
Scientific Jury Selection: Ethical and Empirical, 17 JURIMETRIcS J. 3, 6 (1976). The ultimate jurors
will not be entirely free from bias, but they will fall into a middle ground that is acceptable to both
parties. Cf Hans Ziesel & Shari S. Diamond, The Effect of Peremptory Challenges on Jury and
Verdict: An Experiment in Federal District Court, 30 STAN. L. REV. 491, 525 (1978).
10. A challenge for cause may be sustained if counsel has reason to believe that a previous
experience or current attitude such as an admitted bias will prevent the juror from fulfilling his or
her duty to evaluate the evidence fairly and impartially. Alvarez, supra note 7, at 963. The number
of challenges for cause is unlimited for all parties. ROBERT A. WENKE, THE ART OF SELECTING A
JURY 43 (1979).
11. Parties or their attorneys may dismiss potential jurors without stating a reason through the
use of peremptory challenges. See infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text (explaining juror
challenges).
12. Robert F. Hanley, Getting to Know You, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 865 (1991); William C. Wood,
Effective Voir Dire: A Most Important Part of the Trial, 58 DEF. COUNS. J., 170, 173 (1991).
13. Reid Hastie, Is Attorney-Conducted Voir Dire an Effective Procedure for the Selection of
Impartial Jurors?, 40 AM. U. L. REV. 703, 705 (1991).
14. SAUL M. KASSIN & LAWRENCE S. WRIGHTSMAN, THE AMERICAN JURY ON TRIAL: PSY-
CHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 50 (1988) (citing ANN F. GINGER, JURY SELECTION IN CRIMINAL
TRIALS (1977)).
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for counsel to explore tactical strategies.' 5 In fact, many litigators who
prefer attorney-conducted voir dire over questioning by the judge alone 16
justify their preference by noting these additional functions of the jury
selection process.
While these opportunities may benefit trial attorneys, they are
merely secondary effects of voir dire. They are not valid justifications for
sacrificing precious court time and resources. In fact, these secondary
purposes of voir dire do more to create bias than they do to eradicate it. 17
A juror who develops a rapport with the lawyers during voir dire will be
no better equipped to decide the facts of the case fairly than the juror
who becomes acquainted with the attorneys during opening statements
or the juror who is indifferent to counsel throughout the entire trial. The
well-prepared litigator should be able to persuade the jury of her case
through effective trial advocacy without indoctrinating the jurors in ad-
vance. Further, if counsel-juror rapport and the development of trial tac-
tics were of primary importance in jury selection, exclusive judge-
conducted voir dire would be abandoned because the judge arguably can-
not fulfill these functions. This Note assumes that the main objective of
voir dire is to eliminate jurors who will not weigh the evidence fairly.
A. History of Voir Dire
Although the precise date of the origination of the twelve-person
jury is uncertain, juries were in common use in England by the end of the
twelfth century.'I Jurors were originally selected by the king or his of-
ficers from among the prominent members of the community, and they
were charged with the task of resolving disputes based on their own per-
sonal knowledge.' 9 There was no need to find impartial jurors; in fact,
the jurors themselves were required to conduct interviews of parties and
witnesses in order to decide the facts of the case.20 Further, jurors were
compelled to arrive at the verdict specified by the king. In the mid-
1500s, for example, juries were punished for rendering unfavorable ver-
dicts by the imposition of hefty fines, imprisonment, loss of land and
15. Hanley, supra note 12, at 865; see also KA.SSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 14, at 50-52
(describing legitimate and illegitimate uses of voir dire).
16. See infra notes 39-47 and accompanying text for a fuller discussion of the use of judge-
versus attorney-conducted voir dire.
17. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 14, at 50.
18. STEPHEN LANDSMAN, READINGS ON ADVERSARIAL JUSTICE: THE AMERICAN APPROACH
TO ADJUDICATION 8 (1988).
19. Id. at 9. See generally Stephen C. Yeazell, The New Jury and the Ancient Jury Conflict, 87
U. CHI. LEGAL F. 87 (1990) (providing a lucid history of the jury from medieval times to the
present).
20. LANDSMAN, supra note 18, at 9.
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property, and community ostracism. 21
As Europe emerged from the Dark Ages, the character of the jury
began to shift from inquisitorial to adversarial. Potential jurors could be
questioned and challenged for bias by the parties. 22 Verdicts were ren-
dered on the basis of in-court testimony and evidence as opposed to the
fruits of the jurors' investigations. Most importantly, jurors began to
gain independence from governmental direction. In a 1670 case, a jury
was fined and imprisoned for refusing to convict William Penn and Wil-
liam Mead for unlawful assembly and related charges. 23 In the landmark
proceeding for habeas corpus, Chief Justice Vaughan rejected the notion
of governmental control over juries by the imposition of fines, imprison-
ment, or other punishment.24
While many aspects of the American jury were adapted from Eng-
lish practices, voir dire is purely an American creation. In England to-
day, jurors are selected at random from the pool of eligible jurors;
questioning about potential jurors' attitudes and beliefs is generally not
permitted, 25 and challenges are rarely exercised. 26 Voir dire first
emerged as a result of the Massachusetts Jury Selection Law of 1760
which prohibited the questioning of prospective jurors about their beliefs
once they were chosen for jury duty by the sheriff.27 Because the jury
pool was selected at town meetings, defendants began to use the local
forum to question the members of the pool about possible biases. When
the sheriff's jury list was presented, the defense could use the information
to exercise challenges. 28
By the early 1800s, the right to challenge biased jurors for cause was
firmly rooted. Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the difficulty
of finding jurors entirely free from the influence of pre-formed opinions,
Chief Justice Marshall concluded that it was proper to prevent a clearly
biased juror from being sworn. 29 Later cases from the nineteenth century
21. VALERIE P. HANS & NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 22-23 (1986).
22. LANDSMAN, supra note 18, at 9.
23. In Penn's Case, 6 Howell's St. Trials 951 (1670); id. at 9-10.
24. In Bushell's Case, 124 Eng. Rep. 1006 (C. P. 1671).
25. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 21, at 31. The roots of the prohibition against questioning
jurors was firmly established in the trial of James Cook for treason in 1696. The court stressed the
importance of protecting the jurors from harassment since they were not the ones being tried. Id. at
35. For a more detailed account of the James Cook trial and the role of the seventeenth century jury
generally, see THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE: PERSPECTIVES ON THE
ENGLISH CRIMINAL TRIAL JURY 1200 - 1800, at 222-23 (1985).
26. Ziesel & Diamond, supra note 9, at 498-99.
27. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 21, at 35.
28. For a more comprehensive discussion about the history of juries and voir dire, see id. at 21-
44.
29. Queen v. Hepburn, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 290, 297 (1813).
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also reflect the acceptance of voir dire questioning to eliminate jurors
who may not decide the case fairly. In Connors v. United States, 30 for
example, the Court stated that "[A] suitable inquiry is permissible in or-
der to ascertain whether the juror has any bias, opinion, or prejudice that
would affect or control the fair determination by him of the issues to be
tried."' 31 The Court stressed that this rule is applicable in both civil and
criminal cases. 32
One limitation on voir dire is that it cannot control for bias in select-
ing the entire pool of potential jurors. If a group is completely excluded
from being summoned to the venire, there is little that voir dire can do to
guarantee representation of that group on the jury. Up until recently, the
pool of eligible jurors was created in a non-uniform and highly biased
manner. The key-man system employed upstanding members of the
community to compile lists of eligible potential jurors. The arbitrary
practice of calling upon the unemployed, retired persons, or anyone who
happened to be found nearby the courthouse was also used.33 The result
was a homogeneous venire where a challenge to one juror would merely
result in an alternate juror who was essentially similar to the first in both
demographics and beliefs. 34 The variance in jury selection procedures
among jurisdictions was so great that in 1961, each federal district court
employed a different method to select its jury pools. 35 In 1968, Congress
attempted to remedy the situation by enacting the Jury Selection & Ser-
vice Act,36 which requires venires to be drawn randomly from a fair
cross-section of the population. The burden of assuring fair representa-
tion of the community's demographics and views was thus shifted to voir
dire.
30. 158 U.S. 408 (1895).
31. Id. at 413.
32. Id.
33. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 14, at 22.
34. Dale W. Broeder, Voir Dire Examination" An Empirical Study, 38 S. CAL. L. REv. 503,
505 (1965).
35. KASSIN & WRIGHTSMAN, supra note 14, at 23.
36. 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1968). The Act provides in part that:
It is ... the policy of the United States that all citizens shall have the opportunity to be
considered for service on grand and petit juries in the district courts of the United States,
and shall have an obligation to serve as jurors when summoned for that purpose.
No citizen shall be excluded from service as a grand or petit juror in the district courts
of the United States .. .on account of race, color, religion, sex, national origin, or eco-
nomic status.
Id. at §§ 1861-1862.
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B. Current Voir Dire Practice
The federal rules for voir dire are essentially the same for civil 37 and
criminal 38 cases. In federal jurisdictions, the court may conduct voir dire
on its own,39 or it may allow the attorneys to conduct the examination in
whole 4° or in part.41 The majority of federal jurisdictions, as well as state
courts, conduct voir dire without the oral participation of lawyers. 42 On
the state level, voir dire procedures are dictated expressly by state consti-
tutions, state statutes, or court rules. 43 Some jurisdictions permit counsel
to either submit questions to the judge or to supplement the trial judge's
inquiries." However, the judge has great discretion as to the amount of
input the parties will have in questioning. 45 If the judge alone conducts
the voir dire, the parties and their counsel may be present to move to
strike jurors for cause or to exercise peremptory challenges. 46 However,
37. FED. R. Civ. P. Rule 47(a). Rule 47(a) provides:
The court may permit the parties or their attorneys to conduct the examination of prospec-
tive jurors or may itself conduct the examination. In the latter event the court shall permit
the parties or their attorneys to supplement the examination by such further inquiry as it
deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such additional questions by
the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
Id.
38. FED. R. CRIM. P. Rule 24(a). Rule 24(a) provides:
The court may permit the defendant or the defendant's attorney and the attorney for the
government to conduct the examination of prospective jurors or may itself conduct the
examination. In the latter event the court shall permit the defendant or the defendant's
attorney and the attorney for the government to supplement the examination by such fur-
ther inquiry as it deems proper or shall itself submit to the prospective jurors such addi-
tional questions by the parties or their attorneys as it deems proper.
Id.
39. WENKE, supra note 10, at 15. This practice of excluding counsel altogether from question-
ing the venire has been held constitutional. United States v. Hoffa, 367 F.2d 698, 710 (7th Cir.
1966); Hamer v. United States, 259 F.2d 274, 279-80 (9th Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 916
(1959).
40. WENKE, supra note 10, at 15.
41. Id.; see also Jones, supra note 7, at 132; Dean A. Stowers, Note, Juror Bias Undiscovered
During Voir Dire: Legal Standards for Reviewing Claims of a Denial of the Constitutional Right to an
Impartial Jury, 39 DRAKE L. REv. 201, 202 (1989-90).
42. Rhonda McMillion, Advocating Voir Dire Reform, A.B.A. J., Nov. 1991, at 114 (stating
that in practice, few federal judges permit counsel to question prospective jurors directly); Otto G.
Obermaier, Judge Conducted Voir Dire, in PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, THE JURY 1987: TECH-
NIQUES FOR THE TRIAL LAWYER 154 (1987) (noting further that federal courts deemphasize oral
lawyer participation in voir dire regardless of the practice of the state in which the court sits).
43. Eg., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. lI0A, para. 234 (1991) (cited in Kingston v. Turner, 505 N.E.2d
320, 328 (Ill. 1987)); People v. Jackson, 371 N.E.2d 602 (Ill. 1977) (construing criminal statute).
44. See United States v. Baldwin, 607 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1979); People v. Green, 333 N.E.2d
478 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975).
45. Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981); Darbin v. Nourse, 664 F.2d 1109,
1112-13 (9th Cir. 1981); People v. Menken, 369 N.E.2d 363 (111. App. Ct. 1977); People v. Thornton,
369 N.E.2d 358 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977).
46. People v. Fleming, 345 N.E.2d 10 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). But cf. People v. Willis, 325 N.E.2d
715 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975) (Trial court erred in preventing counsel from supplementing court's exami-
nation with reasonable questions). For an explanation of challenges for cause and peremptory chal-
lenges, see infra notes 51-57 and accompanying text.
1992]
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attorneys may not complain that the jury is not fair or impartial absent
clear prejudicial error.47
Regardless of who conducts the voir dire, the general procedure is
essentially the same. The judge begins by presenting a general introduc-
tion to the venire about the purpose and importance of jury service and
voir dire, and gives a brief account of the nature of the case. The jurors
are administered an oath to answer all questions truthfully and to the
best of their knowledge. 48 Then the questioning begins. Voir dire may
be directed toward potential jurors individually or as a group.49 The first
questions posed are those eliciting background information, including the
juror's name, place of residence, age, marital status, occupation, and level
of education. Jurors are also asked whether they or any member of their
immediate family have ever participated in a suit, whether as a juror,
witness, party, or otherwise, or if they personally know any of the attor-
neys, parties, or witnesses.50 If the answer is yes, the juror is asked to
elaborate and to indicate whether this prior experience has influenced her
in a way that may impair fairness and impartiality. These questions form
the basis for challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.
The standard for challenges for cause and peremptory challenges are
essentially the same on the federal and state levels. A juror is challenged
for cause when something about her background precludes her from be-
ing an impartial factfinder in the case as a matter of law.5 1 Grounds for
successful challenges include evidence that a potential juror: is not a U.S.
citizen; is not a resident of an area under the court's jurisdiction; cannot
speak or understand English; has a mental or physical disability that pre-
cludes effective jury service; is currently under indictment or has not
been pardoned for a previous conviction; or has recently served on a
jury.5 2 The number of challenges for cause is unlimited. Either the judge
or the party moving to strike a juror for cause must state the grounds for
47. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1907 (1991); People v. Etten, 331 N.E.2d 270 (Ill.
App. Ct. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 994 (1976); People v. Turner, 326 N.E.2d 425 (Ill. App. Ct.
1975).
48. WENKE, supra note 10, at 15.
49. See, e.g., Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1902-03, 1908 (holding that the questioning of potential
jurors in groups of four does not violate the Sixth Amendment right to a fair jury).
50. Cf Wood, supra note 12, at 171 (discussing typical questions posed to determine whether a
challenge for cause is justified); Stowers, supra note 41, at 202 (generally listing areas of voir dire
inquiry).
51. JODY GEORGE ET AL., HANDBOOK ON JURY USE IN THE FEDERAL DISTRICT COURTS 50
(1989).
52. MICHAEL T. NIETZEL & RONALD C. DILLEHAY, PSYCHOLOGICAL CONSULTATION IN
THE COURTROOM 17-18 (1986).
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the challenge.53
Peremptory challenges differ from challenges for cause in three sig-
nificant respects. First, the right to exercise peremptory challenges is not
constitutionally protected. 54 Second, peremptory challenges are limited
in number. Each party or each side is allotted a maximum number of
peremptory challenges, the amount depending upon both the jurisdiction
and the nature of the case.55 In some cases, both the plaintiff and the
defendant are entitled to the same number of challenges, while in others,
the defendant is allowed more.56 The third difference between peremp-
tory challenges and challenges for cause is that the party exercising the
peremptory challenge need not supply a reason for the juror's dismissal.
As a result, counsel may strike a juror on any grounds, whether appro-
priate, such as a belief that the juror will be biased against her large
corporate client, or inappropriate, such as because the juror is black.57
The judge has tremendous discretion in the number and types of
questions to be permitted. 58 The only constraints are those of fairness.59
53. Cf GEORGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 50 (explaining that there must be a specific reason
why the juror will be unable to render an impartial verdict).
54. Mu'Min v. Virginia, 111 S. Ct. 1899, 1905 (1991); Ross v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 81, 88
(1988).
55. In federal criminal cases, for example, each side is entitled to 20 peremptory challenges if
the defendant is charged with a capital offense, and 3 peremptory challenges if the offense is punish-
able by fine, imprisonment of one year or less, or both. FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b). If the offense
charged is punishable by more than a one year prison sentence, the prosecution is entitled to 6
peremptory challenges and the defense is allowed 10. Id. In federal civil cases, each party is entitled
to three peremptory challenges unless the court exercises its discretion to permit more. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1870. Other jurisdictions specify the number of peremptory challenges by statute. See Swain v.
Alabama, 380 U.S. 202, 217, n. 20 (1965) (listing various state statutes), overruled on other grounds
by Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
56. GEORGE ET AL., supra note 51, at 51.
57. There is much recent literature and a host of cases addressing the racially discriminatory
use of peremptory challenges prompted by the landmark case Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79
(1986). See, e.g., Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., 111 S. Ct. 2077 (1991); Hernandez v. New
York, Ill S. Ct. 1859 (1991); Powers v. Ohio, 111 S. Ct. 1364 (1991); Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S.
474 (1990); Dunham v. Frank's Nursery & Crafts, 919 F.2d 1281 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.
Ct. 2797 (1991); People v. Edwards, 579 N.E.2d 336 (Ill. 1991); Jere W. Morehead, Prohibiting
Race-Based Peremptory Challenges: Should the Principle of Equal Protection Be Extended to Private
Litigants?, 65 TUL. L. REV. 833 (1991); Jonathan B. Mintz, Note, Batson v. Kentucky: A Half Step in
the Right Direction, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1026 (1987); Robert M. O'Connell, Note, The Elimination
of Racism from Jury Selection: Challenging the Peremptory Challenge, 32 B.C. L. REV. 433 (1991).
While fascinating, this topic is beyond the scope of this note.
58. Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1904; Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 189 (1981); Ham
v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 528 (1973).
59. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931). In Aldridge, a black man was charged with
the murder of a white policeman. Noting that the possibility of prejudice was not remote and that
the stakes were high, the Court held that voir dire questioning must cover the subject of possible
racial bias. The Court also stated that if questions of prejudice prove the juror to be impartial, then
no harm is done by asking, but if a question that would reveal prejudice remains unasked and a
biased juror is obtained, injustice would be great. Id. at 314. There is, however, broad discretion in
this area. In at least two cases, the Supreme Court found that the failure to pose specific questions
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In general, the questions should be designed to gain knowledge of the
juror's mental attitudes about the issues in the case to aid in exercising
challenges.w Inquiries should be clearly directed at ascertaining either
bias or possible incompetency in the particular case.61 Some types of
potential bias, such as racial prejudice and exposure to pretrial publicity,
must be covered during the voir dire examination. 62 Latitude is often
given during voir dire to ask questions leading to peremptory challenges
so long as they are asked in good faith. Inquiries intended to bias the
venire or create an unfair attitude toward either of the parties are imper-
missible.63 Generally, a reviewing court is more likely to find prejudice
where a proper question was excluded than when an improper question
was permitted.64
There is a split of authority as to whether hypothetical questions
may be asked during voir dire. Some jurisdictions state that it is im-
proper to inquire what jurors' opinions would be if certain facts were
proved, how an individual juror would apply the law to a hypothetical
fact pattern, or to what extent the judge's instructions could and would
be followed. 65 This line of inquiry is occasionally used by attorneys to
try aspects of their case in advance and to make decisions about what
types of evidence they should present at trial. For this reason, such hy-
pothetical questions are often barred. Other jurisdictions do permit this
line of questioning as a matter of course or in specific instances. 66 Courts
are also divided as to whether jurors may be asked about how they would
likely react in a group. In some jurisdictions, questioning about how a
about racial bias did not rise to the level of an unconstitutional abuse of discretion under the facts
and circumstances of the case. See Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 190; Ristaino v. Ross, 424 U.S. 589
(1976).
60. Paul N. Luvera, Truth or Consequences - Is Voir Dire Really a Waste of Time?, 43 WASH.
ST. B. NEWS, May 1989, at 11.
61. Specific biases may be relevant in one case but not another. To illustrate, a distaste for
stock brokers may be a relevant bias in an insider trading case but not in a manslaughter trial. The
court is not required to explore every conceivable bias during voir dire. However, failure to honor a
party's request for specific inquiry on an area that would clearly show juror bias under the circum-
stances of the case will be reversible error. Cf Rosales-Lopez, 451 U.S. at 191 ("Failure to honor his
request [for inquiry about prejudice against Mexican Americans], however, will be reversible error
only where the circumstances of the case indicate that there is a reasonable possibility that racial or
ethnic prejudice might have influenced the jury").
62. See Aldridge, 283 U.S. at 314 (racial bias); Mu'Min, 111 S. Ct. at 1908 (pretrial publicity).
Neither Aidridge nor Mu'Min specify a minimum amount of questioning required to discover bias.
They merely hold that the areas must be "covered."
63. Christian v. New York Cent. R.R., 170 N.E.2d 183, 188 (Ill. App. Ct. 1960) (holding that
questions during voir dire should neither indoctrinate nor prejudice the juror).
64. WENKE, supra note 10, at 18.
65. W. Dudley McCarter & Stephen J. Potter, Voir Dire and Jury Selection in Civil Cases, 46 J.
Mo. B. 343, 344 (1990); 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 203 (1969 & Supp. 1991).
66. E.g., Hobbs v. Lockhart, 791 F.2d 125, 129 (8th Cir. 1986); State v. Roberts, 709 S.W.2d
857, 864-65 (Mo.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 946 (1986).
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juror would be influenced if there was disagreement during deliberations
is not allowed. 67 In others, such inquiry is proper.68
Some questions are disallowed because of their form. 69 Questions
phrased in an ambiguous, obscure, confusing, or inconsistent manner, or
so as to imply an incorrect statement of the law are impermissible. Fur-
ther, judges generally prohibit questions that instruct the jury about the
law except with regard to burden of proof or presumption of innocence. 70
In criminal cases in particular, questions should be restricted to issues
and defenses that will be raised during trial.71 However, courts are gen-
erally lenient with regard to the form of the inquiry and focus more on
the substance of the questions.72
C. Jurors' Duties
Jurors have the duty to answer all questions truthfully and to the
best of their knowledge during voir dire. 73 Under the Uniform Rules of
Criminal Procedure, the prospective jurors are instructed that they may
not communicate information or opinions about the trial with anyone
else, that they are not to be exposed to any media coverage concerning
the case, and that they have a duty to report any violations of the rules
by themselves or by others to the court promptly. 74 If a juror fails to
respond to a question that would disqualify herself by an affirmative re-
sponse, the court interprets the silence as a negative response. 75 This
situation tends to arise when a question is posed to the entire venire as
67. Walks v. State, 167 So. 523, 524 (Fla. 1936); McGuire v. Richard Guthmann Transfer Co.,
84 N.E. 723 (Ill. 1908).
68. Temperly v. Sarrington's Admin., 293 S.W.2d 863, 868 (Ky. 1956); State v. Boyer, 112
S.W.2d 575, 579 (Mo. 1938); State v. Morgan, 73 P.2d 745, 747 (Wash. 1937).
69. King v. State, 390 So. 2d 315 (Fla. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 989 (1981) (finding question
improper when addressed to a panel as a whole as opposed to asking each juror individually); State
v. Facaine, 99 So. 2d 333 (La. 1957) (noting that the confusing use of hypothetical questions is
improper); Harrison v. State, 191 S.W. 548 (Tex. 1916) (phrasing questions in an inconsistent man-
ner held improper). But see Ham v. South Carolina, 409 U.S. 524, 527 (1973) (noting the broad
discretion as to form permitted by the Fourteenth Amendment).
70. WENKE, supra note 10, at 18.
71. Cf Rosales-Lopez v. United States, 451 U.S. 182, 192 (1981) (finding the refusal to ask
question on ethnic bias not reversible error when it would not clearly affect the partiality of the jury);
Ham, 409 U.S. at 526-28 (holding that the trial court erred by failing to inquire about racial bias, but
failure to explore bias against beards did not reach the level of constitutional violation). See gener-
ally 47 AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 202 (discussing the scope of voir dire in criminal trials).
72. McCarter & Potter, supra note 65, at 344.
73. Stowers, supra note 41, at 202-03.
74. UNIF. R. CRIM. P. 512(a) (1987).
75. Brady v. Black & White Cab Co., 357 S.W.2d 720, 723 (Mo. App. Ct. 1962) (where the
court asked if any juror had been a plaintiff before, and assumed that jurors who did not respond
affirmatively had never been plaintiffs); Johnson v. State, 5 N.E.2d 343, 343 (Ohio Ct. App. 1935); 47
AM. JUR. 2D Jury § 208 (1969).
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opposed to inquiries directed toward an individual juror. An illustration
would be a question about whether anyone has ever been a party in a
lawsuit before. Intentional failure to answer such questions may result in
a new trial.76
One problem with the current jury selection process is that some-
times jurors fail to fulfill their responsibilities by making false statements
or concealing information during voir dire.77 To be sure, a juror may
intentionally lie, but inaccuracies may also reflect the fact that some ju-
rors are intimidated by the questioning process and have difficulty pro-
ducing the correct response. 78 Some biases may not be discovered until
after the trial is completed. 79 Bias may be either actual80 or implied.81
Jurors may be indicted for criminal contempt for failing to disclose infor-
mation that would lead to a successful challenge for cause.82 If a juror
withholds information that would show bias and lead to a peremptory
challenge, a new trial may be granted.8 3 It is therefore important for
litigators to use all of the tools available to discover partiality and to
choose the jury wisely.
II. SCIENTIFIC JURY SELECTION
One commentator has suggested an analogy between jury selection
and the game of "truth or consequences;" attorneys conducting voir dire
must find out the truth about each juror's beliefs or else they will suffer
the consequences of an unfavorable verdict.8 4 Under this adversarial
view, the goal of voir dire is to impanel a jury with a favorable attitude
toward the client's case, although the statutory purpose of voir dire is to
76. Anderson v. Burlington N. R.R., 651 S.W.2d 176, 180-81 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Brady, 357
S.W.2d at 725-26.
77. Stowers, supra note 41, at 203.
78. Wood, supra note 12, at 171.
79. Valerie P. Hans & Neil Vidmar, Jury Selection, in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE COURTROOM
39, 59 (Norbert L. Kerr & Robert M. Bray eds. 1982) (noting that normative data about jurors is
often obtained from simulations or retrospective accounts of jurors). Hans & Vidmar suggest that
proper trial preparation and questioning can help litigators to better uncover jurors' attitudes and
prejudices during voir dire. Id.
80. Actual bias is the existence of a juror's state of mind which leads to an inference that he or
she will not act impartially with regard to the case. Hopt v. Utah, 120 U.S. 430, 432 (1887) (citing
Utah's criminal procedure statutes); see also Alvarez, supra note 7, at 961-62.
81. Implied bias may be statutory and is based on the recognition that certain relationships
between the juror and participants in the trial are likely to result in either conscious or unconscious
prejudices. Alvarez, supra note 7, at 962.
82. Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 10 (1933).
83. McDonough Power Equip., Inc. v. Greenwood, 464 U.S. 548, 556 (1984) (holding that the
movant must show that a juror failed to answer honestly a material question on voir dire and that a
correct response would have provided a valid basis for a challenge for cause); see also Stowers, supra
note 41, at 205-08 (discussing the Supreme Court's analysis in Clark and McDonough Power).
84. Luvera, supra note 60, at 11.
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select fair and impartial jurors.8 5 Traditionally, lawyers have relied on
their own intuition and beliefs, along with a modicum of common sense,
to guess which venirepersons will be the most sympathetic to their cli-
ents.8 6 The success of this "gut feeling" approach is difficult to measure.
Attorneys cannot determine how the verdict would have come out had
they selected different members of the venire. 87 Further, studies have
shown that damaging jurors often slip through the cracks due to failure
to ask certain types of questions. 88 In other instances, important factors
about a juror's background simply may not be elicited on relevance
grounds. Further, there may be a psychological time limit constraining
counsel from asking one question too many for fear of irritating potential
jurors. 89
Due to these problems and related concerns, the past century has
seen a publication explosion in the area of practice guides which purport
to aid litigators in jury selection. 90 These guides provide information
about the best "types" of jurors to select or exclude based on
demographics and stereotypes. 91 Unfortunately, the authors' suggestions
often conflict, leaving the litigator with lots of "advice," but few an-
swers. 92 Perhaps this is why at least one commentator has noticed the
paucity of instruction in voir dire in trial advocacy courses. 93 For this
reason, many attorneys turn to social scientists for more empirical gui-
dance. What has emerged is a theory called scientific jury selection("sJs").
85. See supra notes 6-17 and accompanying text (on the purpose of voir dire).
86. In fact, most litigators indicate that they "just know" which jurors will be favorable, and
which will be hostile. Their selections are guided by a gut feeling that is developed by years of trial
experience. Demetrio, supra note 2. These attitudes about the "good" and "bad" juror may also be
fostered by the plethora of folklore surrounding the practice of voir dire. Hans & Vidmar, supra
note 79, at 63-65; Solomon M. Fulero & Steven D. Penrod, The Myths and Realities ofAttorney Jury
Selection Folklore and Scientific Jury Selection: What Works?, 17 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 229 (1990).
87. Some researchers have attempted to discover how challenged jurors would have voted had
they been selected for the panel. See, e.g., Ziesel & Diamond, supra note 9. But while experiments
and interviews may provide insight into how an individual juror may vote, the effect of the other
eleven jurors' views on that particular juror's vote remains unknown. This criticism of current jury
selection practices is developed further in Section IV of this Note.
88. Broeder, supra note 34, at 507-10.
89. Id. at 505, 515.
90. Fulero & Penrod, supra note 86, at 230.
91. For a thorough and amusing compilation of suggestions advanced in jury selection hand-
books, see id.
92. For example, Darrow and Bodin recommend jurors who smile, while Wagner and Harring-
ton & Dempsey caution against them. Clarence Darrow, Attorney for the Defense, ESQUIRE, May
1936, at 36; HARRY S. BODIN, SELECTING A JURY 47 (1966); WARE WAGNER, JR., ART OF ADVO-
CACY: JURY SELECTION § 1.04[3][e] (1991); Dennis C. Harrington & James Dempsey, Psychological
Factors in Jury Selection, 37 TENN. L. REV. 173, 178 (1969).
93. David A. Nichols, Truth or Consequences-Is Voir Dire Really a Waste of Time?-A
Judge's Rebuttal, 43 WASH. ST. B. NEWS, Aug. 1989, at 7.
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A. The SJS Process
The goal of SJS is to use the fruits of long-standing social science
research to better educate attorneys about which members of the venire
are their best and worst choices.94 The technique was developed in the
early 1970's in connection with a highly publicized political trial known
as the Harrisburg Seven Trial.95 The case involved Philip Berrigan, an
anti-war activist priest who was tried with others for conspiracy to kid-
nap Secretary of State Henry Kissinger. 96 Faced with concerns that their
clients would not receive a trial by a fair and impartial jury, the defense
counsel hired social scientists Jay Schulman and others to aid in jury
selection. 97 The result was a 10 to 2 hung jury in favor of acquittal. 98
The SJS technique subsequently has been applied to a variety of areas of
law, including medical malpractice and personal injury cases, although
its use has been most prevalent in political trials.99
SJS involves a three step process: (1) development of juror profiles;
(2) determination of which factors will be influential in the given case;
and (3) application of the findings during voir dire. Juror profiles are
essentially a listing of demographic aspects and attitudes of members of
the community from which the actual jury will be drawn. To develop
profiles of a representative sample of community members, social scien-
tists seek respondents from the regions from which the pool of jurors is
drawn. Phone surveys, mock trials, or some combination of the two are
employed. 100 Questions are asked regarding background information
such as age, occupation, preferred leisure activities, and attitudes about
94. Saks, supra note 9, at 6.
95. United States v. Ahmad, 347 F. Supp. 912 (M.D. Pa. 1972), modified sub nom. United
States v. Berrigan, 482 F.2d 171 (3d Cir. 1973). Other notable cases where SJS was employed in-
clude United States v. Anderson, 356 F. Supp. 1311 (D. N.J. 1973) (Camden 28), United States v.
Briggs, 366 F. Supp. 1356 (M.D. Fla. 1973) (Gainesville Eight), Davis v. Lindsay, 321 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D. N.Y. 1970) (Angela Davis), United States v. Banks, 383 F. Supp. 389 (D. S.D. 1974)
(Wounded Knee) and United States v. Mitchell, 372 F. Supp. 1239 (S.D. N.Y. 1973) (trial of John
Mitchell and Maurice Stans). Saks, supra note 9, at 4.
96. Shari S. Diamond, Scientific Jury Selection: What Social Scientists Know and do not Know,
73 JUDICATURE 178, 179 (1990).
97. Saks, supra note 9, at 3. Other noted social scientists involved in the trial include Richard
Christie, Robert Colman, Barbara Emrich and Philip Shaver. Id.
98. Diamond, supra note 96, at 179. The prosecution did not pursue the charges after the
verdict. Saks, supra note 9, at 4.
99. Diamond, supra note 96, at 179.
100. Phone surveys have the advantage of reflecting information about a large sample of individ-
uals at a relatively low cost. However, in mock trials, the "jurors" are exposed to evidentiary tech-
niques and issues that are related to the actual case; the information gleaned from this method are
more accurate reflections of how the "real" jurors will respond. As a result, many social scientists
like to use a combination of these sampling methods when possible. Id. Additionally, local samples
are taken because they may reveal correlations within the relevant community that are both particu-
lar to the given trial and different from a national average. Saks, supra note 9, at 7.
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issues that will emerge in the trial. 10 1 The resulting juror profiles usually
contain the same sort of information that attorneys would discover dur-
ing voir dire to exercise a challenge for cause. 10 2
For the second step, the researchers compile the demographic and
attitudinal information and analyze which types of profiles correlate with
a favorable verdict in the case. The social scientists thereby attempt to
develop a mathematical model that corresponds to the prototype of an
ideal juror.'0 3 SJS also tries to predict the degree of influence that each
juror will have in the group, and which jurors are most likely to be se-
lected as foreperson.'t 4 One advantage of using a SJS method that ac-
counts for both demographics and attitudes simultaneously is that it
helps the advocate to detect juror misconduct, including lying during
voir dire.'0 5 While jurors may often lie about their views of, say, capital
punishment, it is unlikely that they will lie about their occupation or
educational background. If a juror's response during voir dire differs sig-
nificantly from what the profiles suggest, attorneys may use this addi-
tional information in deciding whether to exercise a peremptory
challenge. When possible, the social scientist's hypothesis is tested
through a mock trial. The resulting information is then used to guide
voir dire, the third step.10 6
Because SJS is still in its infancy, many attorneys who use SJS re-
gard it as a supplement to their intuition, and not as a substitute. 0 7 A
lawyer whose gut tells her to accept a juror will be even more certain of
her choice if the SJS method approves of her selection as well. Agree-
ment between counsel and the social scientist can similarly indicate
which jurors are worth the use of a peremptory challenge. In cases
101. For example, in a medical malpractice case, respondents might be asked how frequently
they see doctors, how many different doctors they have visited in the last year, whether they have
regular checkups, about their attitudes toward physicians, nurses and other health care professionals
and about their views on medical fees.
102. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text (describing the information relevant to these
challenges).
103. John B. McConahay et al., The Uses of Social Science in Trials With Political and Racial
Overtones: The Trial of Joan Little, 41 LAW & CONTEMP. PROaS. 205, 214 (1977).
104. Saks, supra note 9, at 9.
105. Id. at 7. For a more complete discussion of how jurors often do not cooperate during voir
dire and the implications of such misconduct, see Hardwick, supra note 8, at 35; Stowers, supra note
41, at 201.
106. There has also been research using computers to both create the mathematical models and
to run simulations of how jurors will reach a verdict depending on who is selected. See e.g., John L.
Wanamaker, Comment, Computers and Scientific Jury Selection, 55 J. URn. L. 345 (1978).
107. Cf. McConahay et al., supra note 103, at 214 (noting that attorneys may use the SJS recom-
mendation even when it appears contrary to their instincts about a particular juror); Saks, supra note
9, at 9 (suggesting that the best choices are jurors who are selected by both the attorneys' intuitions
and SJS).
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where intuition and the scientific method suggest conflicting courses of
action, the advocate then must use her discretion to decide whether to
accept or challenge the juror. In these instances, the SJS prediction is
simply an additional piece of information which the lawyer can use to
help her make her decision.
B Criticisms of SJS
There are several criticisms of the use of SJS, the most obvious being
the lack of empirical evidence supporting its effectiveness. Experiments
testing the predictive value of SJS models have failed miserably. 108 As a
result, some critics have dubbed SJS merely "intelligent guesswork.' °9
For example, there is no conclusive evidence to show that if a case using
SJS is won, that the favorable verdict was not either the result of
chance' "0 or because the side using SJS would have won anyway. I' As a
practical matter, SJS is a product of thorough trial preparation, which is
likely to be helpful in and of itself. Additionally, it is not possible to test
SJS using both the prediction model and the traditional method in the
same trial. Researchers do not have the opportunity to re-try a case
under identical circumstances to see what would have happened if differ-
ent jurors were selected. In psychological terms, there is no control
group. Thus the effectiveness of SJS can only be measured by the ver-
dicts of the ultimate jurors, and not by directly comparing SJS verdicts to
verdicts by juries selected in the traditional manner. However, support-
ers of SJS contend that even in light of an unfavorable verdict, the statis-
tical probability that any given juror selected by the model is a good
choice will be high in the long run."t 2 Following the SJS recommenda-
tions repeatedly over time will yield favorable verdicts to a higher degree
than may be explained by chance. Further, there is no evidence support-
ing the contention that SJS ever actually harms the party that uses it."13
Studies comparing statistical prediction to human intuition show
108. In one instance, a researcher developed a model with four predictive factors that explained
a substantial proportion of the variance of the verdict. However, when the experiment was repli-
cated with a new sample of venirepersons, the model was shown to have no predictive value at all.
Diamond, supra note 96, at 182.
109. RICHARDSON R. LYNN, JURY TRIAL LAW AND PRACTICE § 4.5 (1986).
110. The social scientist's "burden of proof" is usually one of statistical significance at the .05
level. In other words, for a predictive model to be valid in a psychological sense, the experimenter
must show that the probability of the same result occurring by mere random chance is less than one
in twenty, or 5% (.05). For a more comprehensive explanation of the statistical significance of test
results, see DAVID HILDEBRAND, STATISTICAL THINKING FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENTISTS (1986), or
any general statistics text.
Ill. Saks, supra note 9, at 13-14.
112. Id. at 8.
113. Id. at 13.
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that the former yields more reliable results. "14 But it is also important to
understand what it means to say, for example, that a black juror is more
likely to favor a black defendant than a white juror. Such a statement
does not reveal whether black jurors favor black defendants 75% of the
time as opposed to 25% of the time for white jurors, or whether racially
similar jurors vote favorably 51% of the time as opposed to 49% for
racially dissimilar jurors. One would also want information as to
whether the observation was made in 1965 or 1990, and whether the
statistic was meant to apply specifically to larceny cases or racial discrim-
ination cases. Additionally, the level of statistical significance for the re-
liability of a predictor like race may be quite low. 1 15 Stated differently, if
race is helpful six times in one-hundred for predicting a juror's vote
merely by chance, race could still be considered a statistically significant
predictor under the psychological standard of significance. Empirical
evaluations have suggested that the predictive value of most SJS models
is still quite low. 116
Another argument challenging the reliability of SJS is that it is
based on the assumption that the pool of potential jurors is similar to the
members of the community who may be reached through questionnaires,
phone surveys, and mock trials. 117 However, many people who are ide-
ally eligible for jury duty are precluded from serving, and are therefore
not part of the active jury pool. Excluded categories include both the
highly educated persons barred from serving by the nature of their pro-
fessions (such as physicians and clergypersons) and the poor and unedu-
cated who are not registered voters and are thereby omitted from lists of
potential jurors. 118 Others may be selected for jury service but will either
refuse or be unable to participate in the SJS studies. For the mathemati-
cal SJS models to be valid, they must exclude the same individuals who
would not be summoned for jury duty and include as many prospective
jurors as possible.
Some critics of SJS further argue that social scientists' involvement
with the selection of juries is an illegitimate tampering with the adversary
system. "19 They express fear that the juries will be manipulated in such a
way that the constitutional guarantee of an impartial jury of ones' peers
will become meaningless. A similar skepticism has been reflected in
114. Id. at 8-9 nn. 20-21.
115. See supra note 110 and accompanying text (explaining statistical significance).
116. Saks, supra note 9, at 15-16.
117. McConahay et al., supra note 103, at 215.
118. HARRY KALVEN & HANS ZIESEL, THE AMERICAN JURY 6 (1966).
119. Id. at 4.
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cases discussing the use of scientific evidence at trials. 20 But had these
concerns been permitted to exclude technological breakthroughs from
guiding the factfinder in evaluating evidence, commonly accepted tech-
niques such as fingerprinting would not exist today. The methods used
in SJS do not alter the character of voir dire or the pools of community
members eligible to serve on juries. SJS is merely a suggestion for how
lawyers can operate effectively within constitutional constraints. The no-
tion that jury selection may be used to obtain jurors who will render a
favorable verdict is older than the United States.' 2' SJS is simply a way
to guide the advocate's choices.
Aside from questions of the validity and predictive value of SJS, the
scientific method has the disadvantage of a high price tag. Jury selection
experts may charge as much as $200,000 for a single trial.' 22 The mathe-
matical models alone cost tens of thousands of dollars.' 23 If SJS is truly
the panacea for the uncertainty inherent in jury trials, it may be exploited
by wealthier parties until a more cost-effective alternative is estab-
lished.1 24 Innovative law firms are currently searching for less expensive
ways to obtain the same sort of information that SJS provides. 25
Finally, social science research has indicated that there are more
effective ways for counsel to secure a favorable verdict than by using SJS,
including wise selection of venue, 26 convincing presentation of the evi-
dence at trial, 27 and challenges to the composition of the grand jury in
criminal trials.1 28 One informal survey indicated that eighty-five percent
of all criminal trials are decided on the basis of the evidence, while only
fifteen percent are decided by juror biases.' 29 Another researcher found
that the only juror attitude that was a reasonably consistent predictor of
120. See, e.g., Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (systolic blood pressure, the
precursor to polygraph examinations); United States v. Brown, 557 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1977) (mi-
crobe probe technique for hair analysis); United States v. Kilgus, 571 F.2d 508 (9th Cir. 1978)
(forward looking infrared system); State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980) (hypnotically en-
hanced testimony); State v. Boyington, 379 A.2d 486 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1977) (speed radar
detector).
121. HANS & VIDMAR, supra note 21, at 21-23 (describing English cases in the sixteenth and
seventeenth centuries).
122. LYNN, supra note 109, at § 4.5; Fulero & Penrod, supra note 86, at 229 (noting that fees for
SJS run upward of $100,000).
123. McConahay et al., supra note 103, at 214 (costing about $35,000 in 1977 when the article
was written).
124. Saks, supra note 9, at 12-13.
125. One Chicago firm employs a taxicab driver to provide background information about neigh-
borhoods where the potential jurors live. The firm then uses this data to guide voir dire questioning.
126. Diamond, supra note 96, at 182; Miller, supra note 5, at 470.
127. Diamond, supra note 96, at 182-83.
128. McConahay et al, supra note 103, at 206.
129. Id. at 226.
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how that individual would vote was whether or not the juror liked the
prosecutor. 130 In a case where a black man was accused of raping a
white woman, defense counsel used a change in venue to reduce the de-
gree of racial bias among potential jurors.13 1 A survey research firm
found that racist community sentiment, in conjunction with pretrial pub-
licity, had caused a significantly higher percentage of eligible jurors to
have prejudged the defendant's guilt in the original venue than in a more
remote locale.1 32 The remand to a distant county presumably provided a
more impartial jury. 133 Similar methods were employed to obtain a new
venue in the highly publicized Joan Little trial.13 4 These applications of
psychology and sociology have encountered much less resistance from
the legal community than has SJS. The group dynamics model is yet
another framework that litigators may employ to guide their voir dire
inquiries.
III. THE GROUP DYNAMICS APPROACH
One justification for the use of juries in deciding the facts of a case is
the belief that twelve minds are better than one. 135 From this, it follows
that there must be something empirically different about the way that a
group versus an individual makes decisions.1 36 Virtually everyone has
been impressed by the fact that individuals act very differently in differ-
ent types of situations. For example, a person who is very talkative when
in a small group of close friends may become reticent among strangers.
A person's behavior in a group, therefore, depends on both the context
and his relationships to the other group members.1 37 To be sure, group
dynamics have been systematically studied since the turn of the century.
130. Saks, supra note 9, at 16-17 (describing a survey conducted by Robert Buckhout).
131. Irvin v. State, 66 So. 2d 288 (Fla. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 927 (1954).
132. Miller, supra note 5, at 470-71.
133. Id.
134. McConahay et a., supra note 103, at 209-13.
135. Although the Supreme Court has upheld the constitutionality of six-member juries, Wil-
liams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970) (state court cases); Colgrove v. Battin, 413 U.S. 149 (1973)
(federal court cases), this Note will focus on the traditional twelve-member jury.
136. Leroy Wells, Jr., The Group-as-a- Whole Perspective and its Theoretical Roots, in 2 GROUP
RELATIONS READER 109, 114 (A.D. Colman & Marvin Geller, eds. 1985) (Wells advances a mul-
tilevel theory of group processes. He posits that group dynamics may be studied from five distinct
dimensions: the traits and needs of each individual in the group (intrapersonal level); the types and
frequency of interactions among individuals within the group (interpersonal level); the dynamics of
the entire group as a social system (group-as-a-whole level); the relations of subgroups within a
group (intergroup level); and the relationships between a group and its greater social environment
(interorganizational level). One may gain insights into a group's nature by analyzing the group from
each of these perspectives. Most importantly, Wells suggests that the study of the group-as-a-whole
level is the key to discovering the group's true gestalt. Id. at 114).
137. MARVIN E. SHAW, GROUP DYNAMICS: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SMALL GROUP BEHAVIOR
262 (1981).
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What the group dynamics model suggests is that it would be helpful for
the persons conducting voir dire to know in advance not only the stereo-
types and biases held by each venireperson, but what role each individual
will play if she is ultimately on the jury. Put differently, the parties
would want to know how the selected jurors will work together. While
an effective voir dire may shed some light onto the jurors' attitudes and
beliefs, its scope is limited to the issues in the case. Additionally, it is
virtually impossible to predict an individual's group role in advance. The
group dynamics model illustrates how these shortcomings undermine the
utility of extensive voir dire. This section will present the theories and
mechanisms underlying the group dynamics model. Section IV will ap-
ply the group dynamics framework to the voir dire process.
A. Norms, Assumptions and Work Groups
Psychologist Wilfred Bion suggested that small groups evolve
through a predictable series of stages. 38 Group participants begin as
strangers, so they initially seek to make a good impression on their fellow
group members. They share an understanding that they must cooperate
to realize group goals. In order to feel accepted by the rest of the group,
individuals often defer to others instead of relying on their own judg-
ments. 139 For example, a talkative individual may make a conscious ef-
fort to give others the opportunity to speak. It is at this crucial point in
group development where norms and expectations are formed. Norms
and expectations, in turn, shape the way in which group members will
interact in the future. This situational factor is likely to play as large a
role as genetics, personality, and attitude in predicting how a given per-
son will behave in the group.14°
Group norms originally derive from what are termed the basic as-
138. Wilfred R. Bion, Selections from Experiences in Groups; in 1 GROUP RELATIONS READER
11, 12-13 (A.D. Colman & W.H. Bexton eds., 1975). Bion's stages are not comprised of a rigid set of
steps that a group must take in order to progress from a dozen unrelated individuals to a sophisti-
cated, well-functioning group. Rather, Bion explains that newly-formed groups tend to experience
similar emotional problems which progress along a loosely defined continuum. The progression may
be observed by the passage of landmark events.
139. A classic illustration of how individuals will abandon their own senses in order to conform
with the group was provided by Solomon Asch. In Asch's experiment, subjects were shown a stan-
dard line segment and were asked to pick a segment of the same length from a small set of lines.
When alone, subjects were extremely accurate in judging the length of the segments. But when
confederates who deliberately gave wrong answers were present, one-third of the subjects gave incor-
rect responses. Solomon E. Asch, Effects of Group Pressure upon the Modification and Distortion of
Judgments, in GROUPS, LEADERSHIP AND MEN 393, 394-96 (H. Guetzkow ed., 1951). These re-
sults, which have been replicated in numerous studies, suggest that in situations where the correct
answer is more ambiguous, people may be even more likely to be persuaded by other group
members.
140. Saks, supra note 9, at 19.
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sumptions - what the members expect or literally assume about the group
when they enter it. 141 Basic assumptions include notions such as: that it
is impolite to talk when others are speaking; that everyone should have
the opportunity to express his or her own views; or that there will be one
individual who will serve as the group leader. While many basic assump-
tions are shared by all group participants, each individual has expecta-
tions that differ from those of other group members. For example, one
person may assume that quiet group members are shy and in need of
prompting in order to elicit their views, but a fellow group member may
think that others are quiet merely because they have nothing to contrib-
ute to the discussion. Individuals are then placed in a dilemma. They
wish to participate in the group task, which requires compliance with
group norms, but they also desire to maintain their individuality. 142 A
degree of discomfort then arises. This phenomenon is universal, to some
extent, in all groups. When there is a clash between the basic assump-
tions of two or more group members, the norms of the group are defined
and challenged.' 4 3
Coexisting with the basic assumptions is the work task - the primary
job that the group has convened to undertake.'" Work tasks are goals
such as selecting a new employee from a list of potential candidates, de-
veloping a new budget, or preparing a report. At times, the basic as-
sumptions impede progress on the work task. Perhaps an individual
believes that his suggestions are being dismissed prematurely or that the
views of another are unjustifiably favored. Such a conflict is usually not
discovered until the group begins to work toward its goal. One or more
group members feel that their individuality is being compromised for the
sake of the group, and wish to express their discomfort. However, the
norms established by the group prevent the members from airing their
feelings. There may be a group norm of talking in turn, or a norm which
prevents members from addressing their emotions or other personal mat-
ters not directly related to the group task. Additionally, there is often an
141. Bion, supra note 138, at 14-20. Assumptions in this context are more like expectations that
individuals rely on as opposed to hypotheses which must be tested. Assumptions are beliefs that
group members hold to be true.
142. Pierre M. Turquet, Leadership: The Individual and the Group, in ANALYSIS OF GROUPS
349, 368 (G.S. Gibband et al. eds., 1967).
143. Norms in groups are analogous to attitudes such as prejudices on the individual level.
Kenny & La Voie, supra note 4, at 341. The dilemma is illustrated by noting that a challenge to a
basic assumption is more significant than the mere questioning of a prediction. When we formulate
hypotheses, we consider the possibility that our guess may be wrong. Our basic assumptions, in
contrast, are rarely questioned and are presumed to be true. Therefore, we find challenges to basic
assumptions to be troublesome and unpleasant.
144. Turquet, supra note 142, at 354.
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implicit group norm that members must remain in the group until the
work task is completed; movement in and out of the group is restricted.
Thus the member's complaints about undue partiality are thereby ig-
nored. Frustration ensues, leading the slighted members to be uncooper-
ative and disinterested in realizing group goals.
Bion and others have observed a systematic pattern in which groups
confront conflicts in basic assumptions. 145 These conflicts arise in the
context of the work task. First the group addresses dependence or lead-
ership issues. These include not only who will be in charge, but how the
group will be structured. 146 A disagreement then ensues as to whether
an authority figure is necessary or desirable, how many persons should be
in charge, how much power each individual should have, and for what
duration. 147 The group must also resolve whether the work task will be
subdivided, when and under what conditions the group will convene in
the future, and when the group is to be disbanded.
Upon the resolution of leadership issues, the group turns to interper-
sonal issues. 148 These include individuals' prejudices regarding the other
group members which may be based on age, race, gender, socio-economic
status, nationality, occupation, or educational background. The mem-
bers must acknowledge that each individual does not interact with all
other group members in the same way. The disparate treatment is not
explained by the group structure, 149 so each member must examine the
personal biases that influence his or her interactions and interfere with
the work task. To illustrate, in a class composed of thirty white individu-
als and three black individuals, the students may be influenced by the
145. Bion, supra note 138, at 11.
146. In some groups, and particularly in informal settings, it is not clear that a leader is neces-
sary to accomplish the group's objectives. However, there are usually group members who think
that someone should take charge of the situation. These individuals may even nominate a leader.
Cf Warren G. Bennis & Herbert A. Shepard, A Theory of Grup Development, 9 HUM. DEV. 127,
134-35 (1956); Margaret J. Rioch, "All We Like Sheep-" [Isaiah 53:6]. Followers and Leaders, in 1
GROUP RELATIONS READER, supra note 138, at 159. All basic assumptions include the existence of
a leader. Bion, supra note' 138, at 19.
147. The disagreement need not be a fight or even a lengthy discussion; a few words or tacit
acceptance of an authority figure are sufficient to indicate that the issue has arisen and been resolved
in some way. It is also common for a group to accept the status quo with regard to leadership
initially, and to criticize the leader at a later time for group shortcomings. Margaret J. Rioch, The
Work of Wilfred Bion on Groups in I GROUP RELATIONS READER, supra note 138, at 21, 21-25.
148. Bennis & Shepard, supra note 146, at 139-42. It is important to reiterate that the shift in
focus is not a conscious group decision. Once the group becomes comfortable with its organizational
structure, members are then free to test their standing and status within the group-defined
constraints.
149. In some groups, there is an external structural reason why some group members carry more
weight than others. A seasoned architect, for example, would have a more respected opinion on the
issue of designing an earthquake-proof building than would a high school senior. However, there
would be no external structural reason to prefer the architect's opinion on what to eat for lunch.
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race of the professor. This does not necessarily mean that the class will
favor a white instructor over a black one because of the racial composi-
tion of the class. White students actually may be overly enthusiastic
about their black professors in order to try to "prove" to their classmates
that they are not racially biased. The roles that the black and white stu-
dents play will affect the overall bias of the group. Three black leaders
will have a different impact than three black followers or some combina-
tion thereof. The number of possibilities is virtually infinite. These inter-
dependence issues are explained in psychological terms by stereotypes,
tokenism, 150 and intragroup roles.'51
B. Stereotypes & Tokenism
Two of the major factors that influence an individual's effectiveness
in communicating with and influencing other group members are stere-
otyping and tokenism. Stereotypes are generalizations about social
groups without regard to individual variations within the group. 5 2 Ste-
reotypes are not necessarily bad; they may provide some basis for under-
standing a group when little or no first-hand information about its
members is available. 153 The belief that all Americans speak fluent eng-
lish is an example of a benign stereotype that could be used by a foreign
tourist in deciding what language to speak on a visit to the United States.
However, this same lack of information leads to over-generalizations that
present a, distorted view of individual members of a given group.15 4
When a stereotype takes on a hostile and negative emotional tone, sug-
gesting the superiority of one group at the expense of others, it is called a
prejudice. 55
To illustrate these concepts, consider the events during the first
week of school from the perspective of the new incoming students. Ste-
150. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text (explaining stereotypes) and notes 157-65
and accompanying text (discussing tokenism).
151. See infra notes 166-78 and accompanying text (explaining roles).
152. ELISHA Y. BABAD ET AL., THE SOCIAL SELF: GROUP INFLUENCES ON PERSONAL IDEN-
TITY 75 (1983). Examples of stereotypes include beliefs such as that Scandinavians have blond hair
and blue eyes and that Americans love baseball, hot dogs, and apple pie. Stereotypes are most
commonly begun with some kernel of truth, but by generalizing traits of some individual members to
the entire group, they become inaccurate. Id. at 82.
153. Indeed, when group members glean more detailed information about others, reliance on
stereotypes tends to decrease. Individuals are evaluated on the basis of personal experience of their
task-related competence instead of from generalizations about how, say, Americans act. Alice H.
Eagly & Steven J. Karau, Gender and the Emergence of Leaders A Meta-Analysis, 60 J. PERSONAL-
ITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 685, 687 (1991).
154. For example, one who believes the stereotype that Jewish lawyers are shysters will assume
the worst upon meeting one, regardless of that attorney's personal characteristics. The idea is that
stereotypes focus more on the differences between groups than the commonalties that are shared.
155. BABAD ET AL., supra note 152, at 88.
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reotypes affect the school and intraclass dynamics in terms of the way
that the upperclassmen, faculty, and staff are perceived, and the way in
which the freshmen relate to each other both during and between classes.
Seniors may be considered aloof, secretaries may be labelled as bureau-
cratic, and professors may be revered, feared, or respected. An individ-
ual's prejudices will clearly affect who the student will find most affable
in the school. Each person's prejudices and stereotypes, in turn, will im-
pact on the class' communication structure. People tend to communicate
most with those who they perceive to be most similar to themselves, or
people who share common traits with other current friends. 5 6 Initial
friendships are developed in part by reliance upon stereotypes, and dis-
trust of fellow classmates is a result of prejudices. Stereotypes and
prejudices thereby mold a group's pattern of interaction.
The second major factor that influences group dynamics is token-
ism. 5 7 In a token situation, what is important is the proportion of mem-
bers with any given trait. 58 When a group has a large majority of
members with a common characteristic (suc)i as race or gender) and only
a few members without that commonality, the latter individuals will be
tokens with respect to that trait. For example, a lone man in a group of
women is a token male. The effect of the small proportion of men is that
the man will be treated differently and will have a different amount of
influence than he would in a group that was more balanced between the
sexes. 159 Because of his token status, he may be either discounted as
having an unimportant minority view, or stereotyped as possessing the
views of all men. 60 As the proportion of men to women increases, the
token effect of each man decreases.' 6 1  The same token effect occurs
when all but one member of a group are of the same race, age, or socio-
economic status.
Tokenism may be applied to explain group dynamics when different
proportions of group members share a common viewpoint. Peter Berger
provides a clear illustration of ideological tokenism at work.162 In one
instance, a group of cannibals discuss the ethics of cannibalism with a
single non-cannibal. By the end of the conversation, the non-cannibal
156. JOSEPH LuFr, GROUP PROCESSES: AN INTRODUCTION TO GROUP DYNAMICS 39-40
(1970).
157. Rosabeth M. Kanter, Numbers: Minorities and Majorities, in MEN AND WOMEN OF THE
CORPORATION 206, 207 (1977); Eagly & Karau, supra note 153, at 688.
158. Kanter, supra note 157, at 207.
159. Id. at 210-12.
160. Eagly & Karau, supra note 153, at 688; Shelley E. Taylor et al., Categorical and Contextual
Bases of Person Memory and Stereotyping, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL.. 778 (1978).
161. Kanter, supra note 157, at 208-10.
162. PETER L. BERGER, INVITATION TO SOCIOLOGY: A HUMANISTIC PERSPECTIVE (1963).
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will likely be convinced that it is acceptable to eat others.' 63 Berger con-
trasts this scenario with the case where there are two equally sized
groups of cannibals. One group thinks that people over the age of sixty
are too flabby to eat while the other group believes that anyone older
than fifty is unpalatable. The end result in this hypothetical would be a
compromise agreement to eat only those aged fifty-five or younger.' 64
One may therefore conclude that the most effective types of groups in
terms of accomplishing the work task are demographically and ideologi-
cally heterogeneous with minimal token effects.' 65
C. Intragroup Roles
Stereotyping and token effects influence each person's group role.
In the group dynamics sense, a role is a pattern of behavior that charac-
terizes an individual's place in a group. 166 In order to complete its work
task, the group must recognize and utilize the skills brought in by each of
its members.' 67 Each group member tries to ascertain his or her own
role in the group, as well as the roles played by others. 168 The longer the
group develops and the more complicated its tasks, the greater the vari-
ety of roles that must be filled by the members.' 69
The first role that must either be filled or intentionally excluded is
that of the leader. The group members assume that there will be a leader
who will provide guidance and protection to the group as a whole. 170
Some situations are ambiguous in terms of whether a leader is needed at
all, such as in an informal gathering of friends. In more concrete set-
tings, such as a business meeting, a leader may already be appointed.
One problem inherent in the selection of leaders is that there is not
always a custom or set rule for what type of person should fill the posi-
tion.' 7' Any of a number of methods may be employed to arrive at a
163. Id. at 71-72.
164. Id. at 72.
165. SHAW, supra note 137, at 249.
166. LuFT, supra note 156, at 33. Common roles include leaders, negotiators, and emotional
caretakers.
167. Turquet, supra note 142, at 355.
168. Leader and follower are not the only roles available. In fact, the number of labels that may
be created to describe individuals' roles in groups is infinite and depends heavily on what type of task
the group is performing. LuFr, supra note 156, at 34. This note will focus on the roles most applica-
ble to the functions of a jury.
169. William Underwood, Roles that Facilitate and Inhibit Group Development, in SENSITIVITY
TRAINING AND THE LABORATORY APPROACH: READINGS ABOUT THE CONCEPTS AND APPLICA-
TIONS 84, 88 (R. T. Golembiewski & A. Blumberg eds., 1977).
170. Bion, supra note 138, at 14.
171. Indeed, there is no one set of characteristics that defines a "leadership personality." The
required traits of a leader are highly dependent upon both the nature of the group task and the
personalities of the group members.
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leader, including distinctions based on age, gender, race, or educational
background. Whoever is chosen is immediately afforded high status and
a high degree of authority within the group. The important thing to note
is that often the criteria used to select the leaders are arbitrary and unre-
lated to the group task. 1 72 As the group evolves, members begin to ques-
tion the authority vested in the leader and often regret or resent the
designation. Unfortunately, such discontent with the authority figure(s)
is universal to all groups.' 73 In a structured group where the hierarchy
of leadership is clear and based on some recognizable external criterion,
the discontent may be voiced by group members, but little action is taken
to change or challenge the structure. However, in more ambiguous situa-
tions, groups may turn to drastic measures to remove the leader and/or
challenge her authority. This creates intragroup conflict, which easily
interferes with the group's work task. As a result, a new leadership
structure may emerge that relegates the displaced leader to a minor, inef-
fectual role.174
A very important player in addition to the leader is the catalyst, the
person who is able to find an alternative gray area in between the black
and white of leader and follower positions. 175 As the name suggests, cat-
alysts encourage changes in the group structure and organization. 76
The group begins to realize that there are different leaders for the differ-
ent tasks that need to be performed. While one person may be the ritual-
istic leader (i.e. the person who keeps the attendance rolls), another
person may be the discussion leader who decides who will speak in what
turn, and yet another may be the work leader who organizes which top-
ics should be addressed first. There are fight leaders, the people who can
be counted on to create an argument or conffict when the discussion gets
too hot, and flight leaders who will lead the group to abandon a touchy
topic. When the group as a whole becomes particularly unhappy, it may
nominate a scapegoat in the hopes that that individual will represent
group shortcomings, thereby enabling the other group members to focus
172. SHAW, supra note 137, at 271; Turquet, supra note 142, at 357-58.
173. The reason for the inevitable disenthrallment with the leader is that one of each group's
assumptions is that the authority figure is omnipotent and will provide for every contingency. Since
this is an impossible task, the leader will eventually fail and be challenged by other group members.
Turquet, supra note 142, at 357-58.
174. This may occur even in a more formalized setting. For example, if a group of employees
thoroughly discredits its supervisor, the latter's authority is merely titular; the group functions as if
it was self-governing.
175. In psychological terms, the catalysts are persons who are not conflicted with regard to
either dependency or personal aspects of the group. Bennis & Shepard, supra note 146, at 131.
176. Id.
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on the work task. 177 Eventually, the group will recognize and acknowl-
edge the importance of each member's contributions and will plunge it-
self back into the work task with new energy.178
In order to fully understand how a group tackles its work task, it is
important to identify the group's basic assumptions and the role that
each member plays in hindering or realizing group objectives. For exam-
ple, a group that is deadlocked between two clear courses of action may
lack a strong catalyst who can help the factions to compromise and settle
on some middle ground. A group composed entirely of leaders is ineffec-
tive when the members spend at least as much time challenging the au-
thority figures as they allocate to the work task. Similarly, the absence of
strong leaders permits the group to wallow in the basic assumptions be-
cause there is insufficient inertia to direct the group toward its goal.
If one could peek into the future to see which norms, stereotypes,
and role players most impede progress on a particular group's work task
or shape it in a particular fashion, these factors may be manipulated in
advance. Unfortunately, if one prejudice is removed, another stereotype
will take its place. Unless one can intervene in the group's development
while it is in progress, the best that one can hope to do is to try to influ-
ence the roles and basic assumptions before the group convenes. This is
what the attorneys attempt to do at trial. The "indoctrination" begins
with the selection of the jury pool and is not complete until the jury
retires with the judge's instructions. Voir dire is therefore only a small
portion of the process.
IV. How THE GROUP DYNAMICS MODEL AFFECTS JURIES' 7 9
The problem presented by the group dynamics model may be bro-
ken down into two basic dilemmas. First, there is a difficulty in predict-
ing the way in which the jurors will react to one another. This may be
stated as an inquiry into the group's basic assumptions. The voir dire
examination simply cannot provide enough of the information necessary
177. BABAD ET AL., supra note 152, at 102-04; Wells, supra note 136, at 120.
178. Turquet, supra note 142, at 356-57.
179. One important caveat to keep in mind when applying the group dynamics model to juries is
that all juries do not exist or deliberate for a uniform duration. Some trials may last for months or
years, while others last for a matter of days or hours. Clearly, a jury that hears and deliberates a case
in forty-eight hours does not have time to develop as a cohesive group in the same way as does a jury
serving for a month-long trial. This effect may be minimized in a sequestered jury due to the
intensity of the experience. Thus a sequestered jury that meets for two days may be a more cohesive
and developed group than a non-sequestered jury that meets for two weeks. The group dynamics of
sequestered juries, however, are beyond the scope of this Note. For purposes of this Note, I will
assume that the trial and jury deliberations extend for at least a week. This time limit is arbitrary,
but it should be sufficient for the jury to develop through the stages discussed in this Note.
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to assess jurors' attitudes outside of the scope of the issues at trial. The
second dilemma is the difficulty in predicting the power structure of the
jury - what roles each individual will play. This includes determining
who will be leaders, who will be strong dissenters, and who will sit idly
by, contributing little to the deliberations. The effect of this inability to
predict either the basic assumptions or the group power structure is that
the lawyers have little control over the work group - the aspect of delib-
erations focusing on arriving at a verdict. The inevitability of this result
suggests that an extensive voir dire will not provide significantly more
insight into jury dynamics than a shorter, more tailored inquiry. Bela-
boring the jury selection process, therefore, has a high economic cost
with few social benefits.
To illustrate how these types of prediction problems may come into
play, consider a hypothetical traffic accident. The defendant, a black
twenty-four year-old male, is accused of rear-ending a car driven by a
forty year-old white man. The plaintiff claims that he suffered broken
bones and chronic back pain as a result of the collision. Practice manu-
als instruct counsel for the plaintiff to challenge elderly jurors,180
Germans, English, and Scandinavians, 81 certain law enforcement per-
sonnel, and white collar professionals. 182 Because voir dire inquiry may
legitimately explore racial bias, those who are admittedly prejudiced
against black defendants are also eliminated. 183 Jurors A and B are se-
lected. Both Juror A and Juror B are young black working-class males,
but Juror A is also a homosexual. Juror B is homophobic. Sexual orien-
tation is not a permissible area of inquiry during voir dire for this case. 184
The remaining jurors, Jurors C - L, are all Caucasian and have varying
occupations, socio-economic levels, and educational backgrounds.
Although Jurors A and B appear to have similar views from a dem-
ographic perspective, particularly from the standpoint of racial bias, it is
highly unlikely that they will work in concert in the jury room. Personal
prejudices that do not bear directly on the issues of the case will influence
both their alliances to the parties and their desires to affiliate with the
other jurors.
The basic assumptions problem may be stated as the error of select-
180. See WENKE, supra note 10, at 75 (suggesting that retired persons tend to return conserva-
tive damage awards).
181. FRED LANE, I GOLDSTEIN TRIAL TECHNIQUE § 9.45 (2d ed. 1984).
182. WENKE, supra note 10, at 74-75; Hanley, supra note 12, at 868.
183. Aldridge v. United States, 283 U.S. 308 (1931).
184. Because a prejudice toward homosexuals will not show that a juror will be impartial to
either of the parties in the case, the judge would likely find that questions about sexual orientation
are beyond the scope of permissible voir dire inquiry.
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ing twelve individual jurors as opposed to one jury. The attorneys focus
on the question of whether a venire member is likely "favorable" or "un-
favorable" with regard to the parties and issues in the case. But by using
such a framework for jury selection, the lawyers neglect to consider
whether each juror will be "favorable" or "unfavorable" with respect to
working with the other eleven members of the panel.
The group dynamics model explains how this method of jury selec-
tion is problematic. In the hypothetical situation presented above, the
attorneys will likely anticipate that Juror A and Juror B will react simi-
larly to the evidence presented. Yet Juror B may play Devil's Advocate
to Juror A's position simply because Juror A is gay, irrespective of Juror
B's assessment of the evidence in the case. On the other hand, Jurors A
and B, as token blacks, may be driven to cooperate in light of stereotypes
held by the remaining ten white jurors. 1 5 The attitudes and sexual ori-
entations of Jurors C - L will affect the ways in which they react to Juror
A's homosexuality and Juror B's emphatic hostility toward it. These alli-
ances are not predictable through voir dire since it is highly unlikely that
attorneys will discover the entire venire's opinions of gays and lesbians in
a traffic accident case. However, these coalitions will impact upon the
way that the jury analyzes the evidence and interprets and applies the
judge's charge. By pigeon-holing the individual jurors instead of focus-
ing on the group as a whole, counsel unwittingly creates a jury of
factions.
The second problem suggested by the group processes model, the
prediction of individuals' roles in the group, is more complex. Suppose
that a questionable (from a partiality point of view) juror is in the box,
and defense counsel must decide whether to accept or excuse him. In an
ideal world, the attorney would want to know what role this person, Ju-
ror X, will play.18 6 If Juror X is a follower, it may be worth the risk of
accepting him in the hopes that the other jurors will be more favorable,
and that they will persuade Juror X of the defendant's innocence. But if
Juror X is a leader and counsel is uncertain whether he will be sympa-
thetic to the defendant or not, the risk of accepting him is greater. He
185. This will occur to some extent no matter how carefully the attorneys try to eliminate racial
bias. Remember also that the plaintiff's attorney likely will not challenge a racially prejudiced juror
since that individual will be perceived as being beneficial to his case. Further, for reasons discussed
infra, a potential juror may be actually biased, but may not reveal this fact during voir dire.
186. This is not as easy a task as it appears on first blush. Context is crucial. A factory foreman
may be a leader at work, but not necessarily in a jury composed of white collar professionals. Also,
some people have such strong personalities that fellow jurors may consider them abrasive and there-
fore discount their opinions.
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may prove to be a strong advocate for the defense, but he may also
staunchly support the plaintiff.
Defense counsel may try to discover Juror X's leadership tendencies
by asking him about the roles that he plays in other groups to which he
belongs. For example, a person who is president of his worker's union
and an officer of the local PTA may be more likely to be a strong voice in
the jury room than someone who belongs to many organizations on a
superficial level. This type of information, however, may be misleading.
Jurors are unlikely to reveal every leadership role and group affiliation
that they have held in their lifetime. Responses tend to reflect what is
currently important in the juror's life. A middle-aged woman, therefore,
would probably not mention that she was president of her high school
sophomore class, and a recent trade school graduate is not likely to have
great involvement with the upper echelons of his newly-joined trade asso-
ciation. Additionally, jurors may withhold information about their affili-
ations for personal reasons, such as membership in a support group.
The paradox is compounded if the other eleven jurors are consid-
ered. If Juror X is truly an all-around leader and the remainder of the
jurors are followers, the chance is good that Juror X will initially take
charge of the deliberations. But what if the other eleven panelists are
leaders as well? Juror X is then less certain to be the foreperson.
Clearly, there will be a struggle amongst the jurors for the leadership
role. What if all of the jurors, including Juror X, are followers? How is
the litigator to know who will emerge with authority? This is yet another
problem created by selecting twelve jurors as opposed to one jury.
The prediction of jurors' roles is not merely an inquiry for legal pun-
dits in ivory towers. In 1987, the American Bar Association Section of
Litigation presented a mock trial in Chicago where jury deliberations
were videotaped. One juror was described by the defense attorney as " 'a
squishy kind of guy' who was likely to be led by more aggressive ju-
rors."'187 During jury selection, he appeared passive. The defense attor-
ney indicated, outside the presence of the jury, that he would have
challenged that juror in a real trial. 88 Watching the videotape, the par-
ticipating attorneys were surprised to find that not only was the question-
able juror not passive, but he dominated the deliberations, coercing
others to vote for the defense.' 8 9
But perhaps the defense attorney was not entirely incorrect about
187. Paul Marcotte, Voir Dire Strait" Picking a Sympathetic Juror is Hit-and-Miss, A.B.A. J.,
Feb. 1988, at 32.
188. Id.
189. Id.
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the juror after all. Although the juror was a strong advocate for the
defense, his abrasive style alienated some of his fellow panelists. The jury
selection is therefore a gamble where tradeoffs must be made between the
presumed and the unknown.
The problem is further magnified if Juror X is the first person to be
selected, as opposed to the last person to be impaneled. If Juror X is the
last person, attorneys may exercise an intelligent guess as to how Juror X
will fit in with the rest of the group. But if Juror X is among the first to
be impaneled, no one really knows what the other choices are. Does one
risk using a peremptory challenge in the hopes that the remaining
venirepersons will be less negative (or more positive)? What if Juror X
turns out to be a token? One may obviously look at the whole venire and
notice if there are only a few Asian-Americans or a handful of women.
The same cannot be said about guessing which potential jurors decry
capital punishment. A diverse group of potential jurors does not guaran-
tee a diverse jury.
The group dynamics model is not a solution to the voir dire di-
lemma. The group processes approach is merely an alternative lens
through which jury selection may be viewed. What the model does pro-
vide is an explanation for why juries sometimes return verdicts that ap-
pear to be against the weight of the evidence. There is truly no way to
know in advance how jurors will interact to digest the data provided at
trial. Further, learning about how a particular jury conducted its delib-
erations will not necessarily predict the dynamics of a different jury hear-
ing the same case. The implication of the group dynamics model is that
voir dire should be kept to its primary purpose of weeding out potential
jurors who are clearly biased and cannot even attempt to be impartial.
Anything beyond this will cost more in terms of court resources than it
will benefit the judicial system in terms of fair juries.
CONCLUSION
Litigators attempt to "deselect" unfavorable members of the venire
through challenges for cause and peremptory challenges.' 90 Each side
will presumably be satisfied that the twelve ultimate jurors are, at least,
not "unfavorable." From the group processes perspective, this view of
voir dire is problematic because the attorneys think about selecting
twelve individuals to serve as jurors instead of in terms of picking one
190. Some attorneys will try to pick favorable jurors instead of focusing on who they think will
hurt them. The group processes model applies equally well to such a method, but the deselection
model will be used for illustration due to greater clarity.
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jury from a large panel. Stated differently, the problem is that although a
juror may appear to be impartial as an individual, she is not necessarily
impartial in the context of her eleven fellow jurors. 91
Consider a juror who creates the impression during voir dire of be-
ing moderately sympathetic to the plaintiff, but who is not deselected by
defense counsel. This juror will not necessarily vote for the plaintiff at
the end of the deliberations. She may be prevented from fully expressing
her point of view by more dominant jurors, or she may be heard and
understood, but persuaded to change her mind during the course of dis-
cussion. It is also possible that the plaintiff's attorney misjudged the ju-
ror, and that she was actually predisposed to favor the defendant. While
an experienced attorney may be able to make an educated guess about an
individual's attitudes, beliefs, and leadership abilities, prediction on the
group level is nearly impossible. Yet the character of the jury as a whole
is what will make a difference in the verdict in a close case.
Voir dire serves the important purpose of allowing litigants to ex-
clude jurors who will not be able to give each party fair consideration in
rendering a verdict. By exercising challenges, parties may also remove
jurors who could be fair, but who appear biased in some way toward
their adversaries. However, jury selection has become, among other
things, a chance for lawyers to try to "stack" the jury with individuals
who will return a verdict in their favor. The problem in doing so is that
in order to effectively predetermine which potential jurors will be the best
choices, lawyers need to know something about the dynamics of the ulti-
mate jury. Unfortunately, the best that we can hope for is a semi-edu-
cated guess and a strong, well-presented case.
Voir dire is not a waste of time, but current practices do waste time.
Instead of spending days trying to discover if Juror A is more prejudiced
against blacks than Juror B and whether or not Juror C is really politi-
cally correct, attorneys should move through voir dire quickly and effi-
ciently to remove anyone obviously biased, and then get on with the trial.
By conserving precious judicial resources, the shorter trial will best ad-
minister justice in the long run.
191. Kenny & La Voie, supra note 4, at 341 (suggesting that constructs will have different mean-
ings and effects on the individual and the group levels).
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